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THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT: EXCESSIVE FORCE AS 
A PRISON CONDITION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), 
was enacted as a means to deter frivolous lawsuits by prisoners and to 
discourage federal judges from micromanaging prison systems.1  Complaints 
filed by prisoners had grown from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 1994.2  
Congress noted that prisoners seemed to enjoy filing frivolous lawsuits.3  Some 
of these suits included claims of insufficient storage locker space, a defective 
haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a 
pizza party for a departing prison employee and being served chunky peanut 
butter instead of the creamy variety.4  Frivolous inmate litigation costs the U.S. 
taxpayers millions of dollars every year as a result of fighting these claims and 
from delaying legitimate claims from being heard.5 
A. Importance of this Issue 
The PLRA provides that a prisoner shall bring no action with respect to 
prison conditions until all available administrative remedies have been 
exhausted.6  Section 1997e(a) does not define the term “prison conditions.”  
Prisoners have seen this as an end run opportunity to proceed directly to 
 
 1. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); 
141 CONG. REC. S14312-03, S14317 (daily ed. Sep. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham); 141 
CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14414 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). “These 
guidelines will work to restrain liberal Federal judges who see violation on constitutional rights in 
every prisoner complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local 
prison systems.”  Id. 
 2. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 3. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995); (statement of Sen. Kyl); 
141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  
“Jailhouse lawyers with little else to do are tying our courts in knots with an endless flood of 
frivolous litigation.”  Id. 
 4. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14413  (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 5. 141 CONG. REC. S14312-03, S14316 (daily ed. Sep. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Abraham). Thirty three States have estimated that Federal prisoner suits cost them at least $54.5 
million annually.  Id.  The National Association of Attorneys General estimate the nationwide 
costs at more than $81.3 million.  Id. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001). 
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federal court with their claims of excessive force.  While most circuits have 
seen through this and ordered the exhaustion requirement met, the Second 
Circuit, however, has decided otherwise. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case of Nussle v. 
Willette.  In Nussle, the Second Circuit held that the PLRA exhaustion 
requirement does not encompass claims of excessive force.  The Second 
Circuit defined “prison conditions” as those referring to “circumstances 
affecting everyone in the area” and held that Nussle’s beating was a single or 
momentary matter and was not a prison condition, thus he could go directly to 
federal court.  The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, held that the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits regardless of their 
claim. 
This comment is in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nussle.  It 
will be argued that this decision has effectively foreclosed any prisoner’s 
attempt to bypass administrative grievance procedures and take the claim 
directly to court.  The Supreme Court’s decision not only resolved the Circuit 
split with respect to the PLRA excessive force issue, it also left no doubt that 
an inmate must exhaust any and all available administrative remedies. 
B. Summary of Comment 
Section II of the comment will describe the development and background 
of the PLRA.  Section III will examine the circuit split in detail.  The split is 
one-sided, with the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits holding that a 
claim of excessive force is a “prison condition” under the PLRA.  Only the 
Second Circuit has held otherwise.  Section IV will analyze the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Nussle v. Willette.  As support for the Court’s decision, the 
case history and text of the PLRA will be analyzed.  The legislative intent 
behind the amended act will also be examined.  Lastly, the implications of the 
Court’s ruling in Nussle will be discussed. 
Section V is the conclusion statement. 
II.  BACKGROUND & DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLRA 
Generally, when asserting a claim of excessive force, a prisoner will allege 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a prison official has violated his Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.7  
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1994). Section 1983 reads in part: “Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subject, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress.”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 397 
 
Section 1983 can be traced back to post-Civil War legislation.8  In 1871, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act as a means of protecting Southern 
African-Americans from reprisals during reconstruction.9  In the 1960’s, the 
United States Supreme Court determined that citizens could sue local and state 
government officials under § 1983 when certain actions or policies fell below 
constitutional standards.10  Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
prisoners could bring claims under § 1983 as a means to challenge the 
unconstitutional conditions of their confinement.11 
A. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
(CRIPA) and codified it as 42 U.S.C. § 1997.  CRIPA authorized the U.S. 
Attorney General and the federal courts to certify state administrative 
grievance mechanisms and gave the courts discretion to require exhaustion of 
these mechanisms before the claim could reach federal court.  Section 1997e(a) 
of CRIPA provided the discretionary mechanism by which courts could require 
a prisoner to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting a § 1983 
claim.12  One goal of CRIPA was to resolve prisoner complaints on their 
merits, short of litigation; however, that goal was not achieved because most 
state prisons did not seek certification and were not encouraged by the 
Attorney General or the federal courts to obtain certification.13 
B. Prison Litigation Reform Act 
President Clinton signed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) into 
law on April 26, 1996.  The PLRA was Congress’ attempt to reduce the 
enormous amount of frivolous prisoner litigation burdening the federal courts 
 
 8. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K.DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS 
AND JAILS, A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 12 (1995). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 13. 
 11. Id. at 13-14. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994) (amended 1996).  Section 1997e(a) reads: “(1) Subject to 
the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an 
adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court 
shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of 
justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of 
such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available. (2) The exhaustion of 
administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not be required unless the Attorney General has 
certified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial 
compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this 
section or are otherwise fair and effective.”  Id. 
 13. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 8, at 40. 
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and to suppress the micromanagement of prison systems by federal judges.14  
The PLRA created major changes in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) by requiring 
prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a 
claim with respect to prison conditions.15  The PLRA changed § 1997e(a) in 
three ways.  First, § 1997e(a) originally only applied to § 1983 actions.16  The 
amended section now applies to any federal claim with respect to prison 
conditions.17  Second, the courts originally had discretion to require exhaustion 
of administrative remedies.  The courts were allowed to continue the action for 
a maximum of 180 days.  Under the PLRA, the court has absolutely no 
discretion because the exhaustion requirement is mandatory.  Third, the 
amended section has eliminated the “plain, speedy and effective” language and 
the certification process by the Attorney General or the court.  Effectiveness of 
administrative remedies is not an issue under the PLRA. 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The current circuit court split is heavily weighted to one side.  The Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit courts hold that excessive 
force is a prison condition for purposes of the PLRA, thus the prisoner must 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim.18  The Second 
Circuit, relying on Webster’s Dictionary, stands alone in finding that excessive 
force is not a prison condition, such that the prisoner may bypass 
administrative remedies and proceed directly to federal court.19 
A. Circuits Finding Excessive Force to be a Prison Condition 
1. Third Circuit 
Booth v. Churner is perhaps the most relevant and interesting case 
concerning a claim of excessive force brought under the PLRA.20  Booth is 
 
 14. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001).  Section 1997e(a) now reads: No action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  Id. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 18. Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Wendell v. 
Asher, 162 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v. 
Zachary, 255 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2001); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 19. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 
(2002). 
 20. Booth, 206 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). 
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relevant because the primary issue before the Third Circuit was whether 
excessive force should be considered a “prison condition” for purposes of the 
PLRA.  Booth is also interesting because upon being granted certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court’s ruling on the case was centered on an analysis 
of the PLRA phrase “administrative remedies. . .available.”21  The Court 
completely ignored the Third Circuit’s exhaustive efforts to categorize 
excessive force as a prison condition.22 
Timothy Booth, a prisoner in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute 
at Smithfield, initiated his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23  The District Court 
dismissed the case because Booth had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).24  On appeal, Booth made three 
arguments that  § 1997e(a) did not control.  First, he asserted that “prison 
conditions” could not be read to include a prison official’s intentional act of 
violence.  Second, there was nothing in the legislative history of the PLRA that 
would indicate that an act of excessive force should be considered a “prison 
condition,” and third, that the Supreme Court had made a distinction between 
excessive force actions which require an intentional act of violence and 
conditions-of-confinement actions which do not.25 
The Third Circuit, holding that excessive force was a “prison condition”,  
recognized that “prison conditions” was not defined in § 1997e(a), however, 
the definition could be located in another section of the PLRA, § 3626(g)(2).  
That section defines the term “civil action with respect to prison conditions” as 
“any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions 
of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus proceedings 
challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.”26 
The court, in referring to the Supreme Court case Sullivan v. Stroop, 
commented “[t]he substantial relation between the two [provisions in the 
 
 21. Booth, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Booth, 206 F.3d at 292.  Booth alleged that various prison officials punched him in the 
mouth, shoved him into a shelf and a door, threw a cleaning material in his face, and bruised his 
wrists from over-tightening handcuffs.  Id.  Booth believed that his Eighth Amendment right to be 
free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated, thus he filed his claim for an injunction and 
money damages in the District Court.  Booth subsequently filed additional petitions requesting 
more injunctions, money damages and protective orders for transfer to another prison.  Id. at 291.  
Booth also requested an order to improve the prison law library, to hire a paralegal for himself 
and to fine prison officials for contempt of court.  Id. at 292. 
 24. Id. at 293. The court observed that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections had 
established a three-step grievance procedure and that Booth had only satisfied the first step prior 
to bringing his claim to federal court.  Id. at 202. 
 25. Id. at 294. 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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PLRA] presents a classic case for application of the normal rule of statutory 
construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are 
intended to have the same meaning.”27 
The Third Circuit described its analysis of § 3626(g)(2) as one of common 
sense, holding that the term “conditions of confinement” consists of actions 
relating to “the environment in which prisoners live, the physical conditions of 
that environment, and the nature of the services provided therein.”28  The court 
held that a claim of excessive force does fall under the term “the effects of 
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”  
Actions ranging from excessive force to not making basic prison repairs or 
intentionally denying a prisoner his basic right to food, heat or medical 
attention affect the lives of each prisoner similarly by making their lives 
worse.29 
The Third Circuit also supported its holding with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis from another case concerning prison litigation.30  The Supreme Court, 
basing its decision on reading the statute in its entirety, held that the term 
“conditions of confinement” from § 636(b)(1)(B) included continuous prison 
conditions and isolated acts by prison officials.31  The Booth Court reasoned 
that an excessive force claim would be considered an isolated act of 
unconstitutional conduct, thus falling within the definition of a “condition of 
confinement.” 
Judge Noonan began his dissent, “The crux of the case is what Congress 
meant by the statutory term ‘prison conditions.”32  In arguing that excessive 
force was not a prison condition, Judge Noonan relied upon the Webster’s 
Dictionary definition of the word “conditions.”33  He stated that the relevant 
definition was an “existing state of affairs” or “something needing remedy.”  
He then proceeded to define “prison conditions” as “a state of affairs in a 
prison” or “something needing remedy in a prison.”34  Judge Noonan argued 
 
 27. Booth, 206 F.3d at 294. 
 28. Id.  Cell overcrowding, poor prison construction and inadequate facilities would be 
considered “conditions of confinement.”  Id. 
 29. Id. at 295. 
 30. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991).  In McCarthy, a prisoner claimed that prison 
officials had used excessive force when moving him to another cell.  Id. at 138.  The prisoner 
alleged that § 636(b)(1)(B) allowed nonconsensual referral to a magistrate only when a prisoner 
challenges ongoing prison conditions.  Id.  McCarthy claimed that isolated, unconstitutional acts 
by prison officials are not “conditions of confinement.”  Id. at 139.  The term “conditions of 
confinement,” he asserted, referred to continuous conditions and not isolated incidents.  Id. 138-
39. 
 31. Id. at 142. 
 32. Booth, 206 F.3d at 300 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 300-01. 
 34. Id. 
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that the physical beating Booth took was not a prison condition or state of 
affairs, but a single act that could not possibly affect the prison population as a 
whole. 
On being granted certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in 
unanimously affirming the appeals court, declared, “The meaning of the phrase 
‘administrative remedies. . .available’ is the crux of the case.”35  The Court 
completely ignored the issue of “prison conditions.”  Instead, the Court’s 
analysis centered on whether or not Pennsylvania had an administrative 
process in place that could provide Booth with an adequate remedy.  In lieu of 
referring to a dictionary to define “prison conditions,” the Court relied upon 
the statutory requirement that the prisoner must exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before taking his claim to federal court.36  The Court 
also supported its decision by noting that § 1997e(a) was amended by 
Congress to remove the court’s discretion to require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.  The Court held that Congress made its intent very 
clear by making the exhaustion requirement mandatory.37 
2. Sixth Circuit 
Prior to Booth, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of excessive force as a 
prison condition.  In Freeman v. Francis the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner’s 
claim of excessive force was a “prison condition,” resulting in mandatory 
exhaustion of available administrative remedies.38 
Recognizing that the term “prison conditions” was not defined in § 
1997e(a), the court turned to the rule of statutory construction described above 
in Booth.  The court applied that reasoning to hold that the definition of “prison 
conditions” in § 3626(g)(2), “. . .conditions of confinement or the effects of 
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison. . .,” 
applies to § 1997e(a).39  The court also held that the legislative history 
indicated Congressional intent to create a broad exhaustion requirement that 
encompassed claims of excessive force.40  The Sixth Circuit believed that a 
claim of excessive force should follow proper administrative grievance 
procedures like any other inmate complaint so that the prison can take 
 
 35. Booth, 532 U.S. at 732 (2001). 
 36. Id. at 740. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999).  Freeman concerned an inmate at a 
prison hospital.  Freeman alleged that a guard assaulted him after he had requested medical 
attention from a nurse.  Id. at 642-43.  Freeman also claimed that he suffered a separated shoulder 
and sued the hospital staff and the guard for damages.  Id. at 643. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 644 (determining that the PLRA was enacted to reduce frivolous lawsuits by 
prisoners and to prevent the judicial system from micromanaging the nation’s prison systems). 
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immediate corrective action if a problem truly exists.41  The court also briefly 
referred to the Supreme Court’s holding in McCarthy v. Bronson to find that a 
prisoner’s claim of excessive force should be considered a “condition of 
confinement.”42 
3. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit held in Smith v. Zachary, that excessive force was to 
be considered a prison condition for purposes of the PLRA.43  The court based 
its decision upon the rule of statutory construction and the legislative intent 
behind the enactment of the PLRA. 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that § 1997e(a) did 
not define the term “prison conditions,” however, a definition could be found 
in § 3626(g)(2). 
The court remarked, “the words of a statute must be read in their context 
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.  Thus, the 
meaning of a statute may be affected by a related act, especially if that act 
provides greater specificity on the issue at hand.”44  The court found both 
sections (1) concerned prison litigation, (2) were multi-issue acts, (3) were 
designed to specifically address inmate issues, and (4) both were part of the 
same legislation with the similar objectives of encouraging prisons to handle 
inmate grievances internally and reducing the court’s attempts to micromanage 
the prison system.45  The court’s statutory construction analysis mirrored that 
of the Booth and Freeman courts to find that a claim of excessive force comes 
within the § 3626(g)(2) definition of “prison conditions.”  The court supported 
its finding by stating that Smith’s assault claim met the second half definition 
of “prison condition” in § 3626(g)(2) because he was affected by an action, the 
assault, by government officials, the guards.46 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  McCarthy held that inmate claims challenging conditions of confinement include 
ongoing prison conditions and specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials.  Id. 
 43. Smith, 255 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2001). Inmate Smith alleged that he had been assaulted by 
prison guards in retaliation for his participation in a prison riot.  Id. at 453.  He claimed to have 
been beaten in the face, buttocks and groin.  Id.  Then Smith claimed that he was handcuffed, 
beaten again and placed in a prison shower unit where he was hit and jabbed with batons.  Id.  
Smith also alleged the guards then stripped him naked and continued to beat him over an 
unspecified period of time.  Id.  Finally, Smith claimed he was denied medical treatment for the 
injuries until one week later.  Id.  He failed to follow an established administrative review process 
for prisoner complaints.  Id. at 448.  He also failed to follow the administrative review process in 
appeal to the warden’s response.  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 449. 
 46. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit then proceeded to determine the plain-meaning of the 
term “prison conditions” in  § 1997e(a).  Smith argued that by applying the 
plain-meaning rule to the term “prison conditions” one could only conclude 
that the word “conditions” does not include a single, isolated event.  The court 
concluded that congressional intent of the word “conditions” was to include a 
single, isolated event by referring to the opening section of the United States 
Code of which § 1997e(a) is a part.47 
Based upon its analysis of the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that Congress intended to broaden the administrative remedy 
exhaustion requirement to include all federal claims.  The court determined 
that Congress broadened the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) in three 
ways: (1) by requiring mandatory exhaustion rather than giving the court 
discretion, (2) by not limiting the requirement to only § 1983 claims, and (3) 
by eliminating the restriction that exhaustion was required only if the prison 
had an effective means of administrative review.48 
Smith argued that Congress intended to exclude claims of excessive force 
from having to meet the exhaustion requirement.  In rejecting this argument, 
the court noted that the PLRA contained an exclusion only for habeas corpus 
proceedings and that Congress would have enumerated claims of excessive 
force as an exclusion had it intended to exempt them.49 
Dissenting, Judge Williams argued that the alleged beatings Smith took did 
not meet the plain-meaning of “prison conditions” under § 1997e(a) or the 
definition of “prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2).50  Judge Williams believed 
the majority altered the language of § 1997e(a) to achieve their perception of 
the Congressional intent.  He argued that it was the court’s duty to  apply the 
statute as Congress had written, not to mold the language to create a statute 
that Congress did not intend.51 
Judge Williams also referred to the Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“conditions.”  He argued that “conditions” as “attendant circumstances” or 
“existing state of affairs” refer to the environment or surroundings in which 
one lived and  “conditions” would require that something occur routinely or 
with regularity.52  He was unable to determine how an isolated, violent assault 
would fit into this definition of “conditions.”  Judge Williams also declared 
 
 47. Id.  The Code states: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise. . .words importing the plural include the singular.”  Id. 
 48. Id. at 451. 
 49. Id. (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23) (“The general rule 
of statutory construction is that the enumeration of specific exclusions from the operation of a 
statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded.”). 
 50. Smith, 255 F.3d at 454 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 453-54. 
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that excessive force claims do not fit within the second half of the “prison 
conditions” definition of § 3626(g)(2).  He argued that the language of that 
section addresses claims only relating to the effects of actions.  He believed 
that claims of excessive force were related to actions, not to claims related to 
effects.53  Judge Williams concluded that since Congress did not explicitly 
write into the statute that claims of excessive force were to be considered a 
“prison condition,” the court was not justified to accomplish something they 
perceived was Congress’ intent.54 
B. Circuits Finding Excessive Force to not be a Prison Condition 
1. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit stands alone in its determination that claims of 
excessive force are not “prison conditions” for purposes of the PLRA.  In 
Nussle v. Willette, the court, in noting that the issue was a matter of first 
impression, held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement 
under § 1997e(a) did not apply to claims of excessive force.55  The Second 
Circuit analyzed the statutory text of § 1997e(a), the relationship between § 
1997e(a) and § 3626(g)(2) and the structure, purpose and legislative history of 
the PLRA.56  Nussle alleged that prison guards violated his Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.57  The District 
Court dismissed the case because Nussle failed to exhaust the available 
administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. 
The Second Circuit found the term “prison conditions” to be ambiguous.  
The court noted that the term was not defined anywhere in § 1997 so a reading 
of Webster’s Dictionary was required.  The court proceeded to apply the 
reasoning in the Booth dissent to find that a particular violent incident is not 
encompassed by the term “prison conditions.”58 
Next, the court proceeded to examine the relationship between 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).  The court found the definition of 
“prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2) to be just as ambiguous as the text in § 
 
 53. Id. at 454-55. 
 54. Id. at 455. 
 55. Nussle, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 97.  Nussle alleged that guards beat him without provocation or justification.  Id.  
Nussle also claimed the guards beat him so much that he lost control of his bowels and that the 
guards threatened to kill him if he reported the incident.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 101.  The court found the term “conditions” meant “attendant circumstances” or an 
“existing state of affairs.”  Id.  The term “prison conditions” would refer to circumstances 
affecting everyone in the area affected by them rather than a single momentary beating.  Id. 
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1997e(a).59  The court decided the § 3626(g)(2) definition only applied to itself 
and not to § 1997e(a).  The Second Circuit then analyzed the definition of 
“prison conditions” from § 3626(g)(2).  Like most courts, the Second Circuit 
found the first half of the definition, “conditions of confinement” to not 
encompass claims of excessive force.  In examining the second half of the 
definition, “the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
persons confined in prison,” the court declared that such language would never 
be used to describe an isolated incident of assault.60 
Because the Second Circuit found the text of § 1997e(a) and § 3626(g)(2) 
to be ambiguous, it looked to the structure and purpose of the PLRA as a 
whole, the legislative history of the PLRA, and the legal context for direction 
in determining the meaning of “prison conditions.”61  The court first turned its 
attention to § 3626(g)(2) to determine whether or not this section should 
actually be read to provide a definition of “prison conditions” for § 1997e(a), 
as many courts have so held.  The court found that the purpose of § 1997e(a) 
was to discourage and eliminate frivolous lawsuits by inmates before they got 
to federal court and the purpose of § 3626(g)(2) was to prohibit liberal Federal 
judges from micromanaging the prison system.62  The Second Circuit also 
analyzed the term “government officials” from the second part of the definition 
of “prison conditions” from § 3626(g)(2).63  The term “government officials”, 
the court reasoned, would include administrative or policymaking employees, 
rather than the guards, having daily contact with the inmates, who would not 
have administrative authority.64  The court held that importing the definition of 
“prison conditions” from§ 3626(g)(2) into § 1997e(a), would be to ignore the 
context and statutory purposes the two sections advanced.65 
The Second Circuit also concluded that the legislative history of the PLRA 
demonstrated that the definition of “prison conditions,” as used in § 
3626(g)(2), was not meant to be imported into § 1997e(a).  The court found the 
 
 59. Id. at 102. 
 60. Id. at 102-03 (referring to the Booth dissent in which Judge Noonan argued that if a 
guard hit a prisoner in the mouth, it would be highly unlikely that the prisoner would say, “A 
government official has taken an action having an effect on my life”). 
 61. Id. at 103-07. 
 62. Id. at 103-04. 
 63. Id. at 105( holding that “it stretched that provision’s definition too far to characterize 
lower level government employees, such as corrections officers, as ‘government officials,’ since 
such a reading of the term ‘officials’ would include just about any government employee without 
regard to level of responsibility or authority). 
 64. Id. at 104.  The court supported this reasoning by referring to the term “official,” used in 
section § 3626(a)(3)(F) (That section reads: “Any State or local official [whose] jurisdiction or 
function “[includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of 
prison facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons. . . .”]  Id. 
 65. Id. at 105. 
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sponsors of the PLRA intended to divide the bill into two sets of provisions.66  
The first being those directed at reducing frivolous lawsuits and the second 
being those that would prevent the micromanagement of prison systems by 
federal judges.67  Based upon the court’s analysis of the statutory purpose and 
context, the court determined that isolated incidents of assault were not to be 
considered as falling under § 3626(g)(2).  The court found no reason to apply 
the definition of “prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2) to claims of excessive 
force, especially if those claims do not pertain to the effects on prisoners from 
judicial micromanagement. 
IV.  ANALYSIS: EXCESSIVE FORCE AS A “PRISON CONDITION” 
A. Statutory Text 
1. Analysis of the plain meaning of § 1997e(a) 
To ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, the particular statutory 
language at issue must be examined, as well as the language and design of the 
statute as a whole.68  Although the term “prison conditions” is not defined in 
section 1997, one can apply a common sense approach to realize that excessive 
force used by a prison official to control an inmate is a “prison condition” for 
purposes of the PLRA. 
Physical force used by guards upon inmates takes place everyday in 
America’s prison systems.  Violence is a way of life for inmates and guards 
alike.  While the majority of these acts are probably justified to contain a 
violent prisoner, there are times when guards exceed their bounds and violate 
the prisoner’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.  These actions may occur as single or momentary matters but they 
affect the entire prison population. 
Because not all prisons are managed as model correctional institutions, 
excessive force by prison officials may be considered a living condition of 
prison life at certain facilities.  Extreme physical acts of force upon inmates 
would be considered a circumstance of that prison society.  As such, the act of 
excessive force could be a by-product of systemic problems, including poor 
hiring and training procedures or inadequate procedures for responding to 
insubordinate or violent behavior by inmates.69 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  The court supported this conclusion by noting floor statements that the court said 
“suggest that the concern over “frivolous” suits in this context refers to subject matter, rather than 
to the factual merits of a claim, that, if proven, would be meritorious.”  Id. 
 68. K Mart v. Cartier, Inc. 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). 
 69. Smith, 255 F.3d at 459. 
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Acts of excessive force by prison officials may be made possible by the 
prison environment itself, thus the remedy lies in addressing the prison 
conditions that facilitate these acts at the source.  While screening out frivolous 
lawsuits was a driving force behind enacting the PLRA, one mandate of the 
PLRA was to exhaust all available administrative remedies.70  The exhaustion 
requirement is the most efficient means of alerting the prison system that a 
problem exists.  The administrative grievance process provides prompt notice 
to prison officials, while a lawsuit could take years before a court makes a 
decision.  Requiring the prisoner to follow administrative grievance procedures 
affords prison officials the opportunity to address the situation internally.  In 
the case of excessive force claims, prison officials can take immediate action, 
such as firing the guards responsible for the acts, implementing training 
procedures or providing additional supervision of staff.  Any of these actions 
taken by the prison will affect, hopefully improving, the living conditions of 
the entire prison population. 
2. Canon of Statutory Construction 
At dispute is whether or not the definition of “prison conditions” found in 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) can be applied to PLRA claims of excessive force.  
Since 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) does not define “prison conditions”, those courts 
ruling in favor of administrative exhaustion have relied upon the rule of 
statutory construction to hold that the definition of “prison conditions” from § 
3626(g)(2) can be used in PLRA litigation.  The rule of statutory construction 
can be applied when a substantial relationship exists between two sections of 
legislation.71  The rule states that when identical words are used in different 
parts of related legislation, the words are intended to have the same meaning.72 
Sections 3626 and 1997e are substantially related.  Both sections were part 
of the same legislation and each concern inmate issues and prison litigation.  
Section 3626 provides inmates with a means of remedy for any civil action 
with respect to prison conditions.  It details the requirements of prospective 
relief and preliminary injunctive relief and also the termination of prospective 
relief.  Section 3626(g)(2) defines the term “civil action with respect to prison 
condition” as any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the 
conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on 
the lives of persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus 
proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.73  
Section 1997e concerns Federal suits by inmates with respect to prison 
 
 70. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7527 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 71. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000). 
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conditions.  It requires that prisoners exhaust all administrative grievance 
procedures prior to initiating a Federal claim if the claim relates to prison 
conditions.  Since both sections are primarily concerned with violations of 
prison conditions, it is clear the sections are substantially related and the rule 
of statutory construction can be applied. 
The next issue is whether or not the definition of “prison conditions” from 
§ 3626(g)(2) is an appropriate fit for § 1997e(a).  The first half of the definition 
in § 3626(g)(2), “conditions of confinement” can include claims of excessive 
force with respect to the PLRA.  Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, the 
Supreme Court held that an inmate’s suit challenging conditions of 
confinement, included claims involving isolated incidents of unconstitutional 
conduct as well as challenges to ongoing prison conditions.74  Based upon the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in McCarthy, a claim of excessive force should be 
considered a “condition of confinement.”  The use of excessive force by prison 
officials on an inmate is an isolated incident of unconstitutional conduct as far 
as that inmate is concerned.  It can also be representative of an ongoing prison 
condition if excessive force is routinely used by the same officials within the 
same prison system. 
The second half of the definition in § 3626(g)(2), “the effects of actions by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison” is perhaps an 
even better fit for § 1997e(a).  Clearly, a dictionary is not required to interpret 
this part of the definition of “prison conditions.”  The use of excessive force 
upon an inmate is an “action.”  A prison guard employed at a state or federal 
penitentiary should be considered a government official.  The guard’s 
supervisors, prison administrative personnel and any other prison employees 
responsible for inmate security or inmate care should also be considered a 
government official.  The act of excessive force by a government official upon 
an inmate will have an immediate and possible long-term physical and mental 
affect on that inmate.  The use of excessive force could also be indicative of 
conditions of poor hiring practices, lack of training or insufficient supervision 
of prison officials responsible for inmate security.  All of these conditions 
affect the prison environment as a whole. 
B. Legislative History 
The limited legislative history of the PLRA indicates that Congress 
intended claims of excessive force to be subject to the exhaustion requirement 
of § 1997e(a).  Senators Dole, Hatch and Kyl introduced the PLRA in 1995.  
Senator Dole noted the drastic increase in prisoner litigation and the 
 
 74. McCarthy, 500 U.S. 136. 
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detrimental effects it was having on the judicial system.75  The initial draft of 
the PLRA applied only to civil rights violations under § 1983 and allowed for 
judicial discretion concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies.76  
The goal of the PLRA was not only to limit frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, but 
to also deter courts from micromanaging America’s prisons.77  Section 
1997e(a) was eventually amended to require mandatory, rather than 
discretionary, exhaustion of administrative remedies and applied to all federal 
claims, not just § 1983 suits.78 
Congress did not enumerate a claim of excessive force, or any other 
specific claim, as exclusions to § 1997e(a).  In fact, there is no record 
indicating any congressional intent to exclude claims of excessive force from 
the PLRA.  Also, there is no legislative history indicating any distinctions 
between excessive force claims and “prison conditions” claims.  Congress 
allowed for a broad exhaustion requirement to ensnare all varieties of frivolous 
inmate suits.  Congress would have defeated the purpose of a broad exhaustion 
requirement by shielding certain types of claims from the PLRA’s reach.  
While most of the legislative comments concern frivolous suits that seem 
ludicrous, it was realized that all inmate suits, even claims of excessive force, 
have the potential to be frivolous and overburden the judicial system.  The 
burden these lawsuits presented to the courts was supported by statistical 
evidence.  The cited statistical studies did not distinguish between conditions 
of confinement actions and excessive force actions.79  The requirement of 
subjecting the claim to the administrative grievance process does not prevent 
the inmate from eventually filing suit.  The broad exhaustion requirement 
merely serves to weed out those claims of excessive force that are frivolous 
and to provide prison officials the opportunity to correct a system failure when 
the claim is valid. 
There was limited resistance to the enactment of the PLRA.80  The 
opponent’s main objection to the PLRA was that it would frustrate meritorious 
 
 75. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).  
“Over the past two decades, we have witnessed an alarming explosion in the number of lawsuits 
filed by State and Federal prisoners.”  Id.  “Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, 
waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-
abiding population.”  Id. 
 76. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 77. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418  (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  
“While prison conditions that actually violate the Constitution should not be allowed to persist, I 
believe that the courts have gone too far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons.”  Id. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001). 
 79. ABRAHAM, supra note 5. 
 80. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). “I do not intend to offer an amendment to this bill, because it is clear that a majority of 
the Senate would not vote to strike the provision, and I do not believe the Senate is positioned to 
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claims.81  In passing the PLRA, Congress did not eliminate the court’s ability 
to remedy a constitutional violation of an inmate’s civil rights.  Congress 
merely took steps that would ensure only those claims with merit would be 
heard by processing the inmate’s claim through the administrative grievance 
chain. 
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Nussle v. Willette 
The Second Circuit, ruling in Nussle v. Willette, held that excessive force 
was not a “prison condition” and thus not subject to the exhaustion 
requirement of the PLRA.82  The Supreme Court resolved the Circuit split by 
unanimously reversing the Second Circuit.  The Court, in siding with the 
majority of the Circuits, held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies 
to all prisoner suits about prison life, whether they involve general 
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege an Eighth 
Amendment violation based upon the use of excessive force or some other 
wrong.83  The Supreme Court’s decision was not limited to claims of excessive 
force.  The Court made it clear that all prisoner suits must proceed through the 
administrative grievance process.  No shortcuts to federal court are to be 
allowed. 
To determine the meaning of the term “prison condition,” the Supreme 
Court relied on the text and purpose of the PLRA, Court precedent, and the 
weight of lower court rulings.84  The Court also noted that the Second Circuit 
might have reached the opposite decision had the opinion of a unanimous 
Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner, decided almost one year later, been 
available.85 
In its analysis of the legislative intent and text of the PLRA, the Court 
recognized that all available remedies must be exhausted, even if the relief 
sought is not available through grievance proceedings.  The Court stated that 
the legislative intent of § 1997e(a) was to reduce the quantity and increase the 
 
consider detailed improvements to the PLRA during debate on this omnibus appropriations bill.  
But the abbreviated nature of the legislative process should not suggest that the proposal is 
noncontroversial in Congress.”  Id. 
 81. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
“In attempting to curtail frivolous prisoner lawsuits, this legislation goes much too far, and 
instead may make it impossible for the Federal courts to remedy constitutional and statutory 
violations in prisons, jails and juvenile detention facilities.”  Id.  “In seeking to curtail frivolous 
lawsuits, we cannot deprive individuals of their basic civil rights.”  Id. 
 82. Nussle, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002). 
 83. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002). 
 84. Id. at 986. 
 85. Id. at 988. 
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quality of inmate suits.86  The Court determined that attempting to resolve the 
prisoner’s claim through the internal prison grievance process might actually 
improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, such that there would be 
no need for litigation.87  The process would filter out frivolous claims and 
create an administrative record that more accurately describes the issues 
involved in the claim.88 
The Court also noted that the title of a statue and the heading of a section 
can be used for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.89  
Here, § 1997e is titled “Suits by prisoners.”  The Court reasoned that based 
upon this title, Congress did not intend to segregate excessive force claims 
from the universe of inmate suits.90  The Court held that it seemed unlikely that 
Congress, after including a mandatory exhaustion requirement in the PLRA, 
would allow a prisoner to plead an excessive force claim and then allow him 
the option of administratively exhausting the claim.91 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the congressional intent of the PLRA was 
correct.  As noted above, Congress did not specifically define “prison 
conditions” in section 1997.  Congress also made no mention to exclude claims 
of excessive force from § 1997e(a).  In fact, there are no enumerated 
exclusions to § 1997e(a).  There is also no evidence indicating that Congress 
provided an avenue for prisoners to bypass the exhaustion requirement by 
filing a claim of excessive force.  Congress intended that any occurrence in 
prison is a condition of that environment, thus any suit by an inmate relating to 
the inmate’s existence within the prison system is subject to the PLRA.  In 
Booth, the Court made note of the congressional intent to broaden the 
exhaustion requirement.92  The Supreme Court recognized that the intent of 
Congress was to create a statute that would deter frivolous lawsuits by 
requiring inmates to exhaust the administrative grievance process regardless of 
the claim.  Thus, whether the suit is for excessive force or for being served the 
wrong type of peanut butter, the claim must proceed through the administrative 
grievance system first. 
A large part of the Second Circuit’s opinion was devoted to an analysis of 
the relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
The Second Circuit held that the second part of the definition of “prison 
conditions” from § 3626(g)(2) is ambiguous and applies only to itself, while a 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 990. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Booth, 532 U.S. at 740 (2001).  The Court commented, “ . . .we think that Congress has 
mandated exhaustion clearly enough. . .”  Id. 
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majority of other Circuits have held otherwise.93  The Supreme Court did not 
issue an opinion on the reading of  § 3626(g)(2) and whether or not it could be 
applied to § 1997e(a).  The Court held that the canon of statutory construction 
was not required since Congress had clearly implemented a general rule of 
exhaustion within the PLRA.94 
In addition to examining the legislative intent and text of the PLRA, the 
Supreme Court also relied upon its analysis in McCarthy v. Bronson.95  
McCarthy involved a suit by a prisoner alleging his rights had been violated as 
a result of prison officials using excessive force upon him.96  The petitioner in 
McCarthy argued that an unconstitutional, isolated act of violence against a 
prisoner should not be classified as an ongoing prison condition.97  The Court 
determined that the statutory phrase “challenging conditions of confinement” 
must be viewed in its proper context and not in isolation and that a broad 
reading of the statute was necessary to comport with the legislative intent 
behind the statute.98  The Supreme Court held that prisoner suits challenging 
“conditions of confinement” when read in context, authorized suits involving 
isolated incidents of unconstitutional conduct as well as challenges to ongoing 
prison conditions. 
In Nussle, the Supreme Court again read the statutory term at issue not in 
isolation but in its proper context.  Based on the congressional intent to 
promote administrative remedies, filter out frivolous claims and to create 
improved claims for litigation, the Court held that inmate suits alleging the use 
of excessive force, whether just once or many times, could only be classified as 
a “prison condition.”99  Perhaps more importantly, the Court noted the folly of 
Nussle’s isolated incident argument.  The Court asked why a prisoner should 
be able to bypass the administrative grievance process when he has been 
assaulted on only one occasion, but not when the beatings are widespread and 
routine, as Nussle alleged would be indicative of an on going prison 
condition.100 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000).  The second part of the “prison conditions” definition 
reads: “. . .the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in 
prison. . .”  Id. 
 94. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002). 
 95. Id. at 989. 
 96. McCarthy, 500 U.S. 136 (1991).  The case involved the interpretation the term 
“conditions of confinement” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 
 97. Id. at 138-39. 
 98. Id. at 139-42 (holding that the Court must look to the statutory language at issue, as well 
as the language and design of the statute as a whole). 
 99. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 990. 
 100. Id. at 991-92. 
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Congress created the PLRA to curb the escalating number of frivolous 
lawsuits by prisoners and to prevent Federal judges from micromanaging the 
nation’s prison systems.  Originally, the Act only applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims and gave the courts discretion to require an inmate to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to taking the claim to court.  The PLRA was 
eventually amended to encompass all federal claims by prisoners and made the 
exhaustion requirement mandatory.  It is apparent from the legislative history 
that Congress intended all inmate claims to be subjected to the exhaustion 
requirement.  Congress reasoned that inmate suits should be resolved at the 
administrative hearing level and that if the prisoner was still not satisfied with 
the results after exhausting all available administrative remedies, at least a 
better record of the complaint would already be developed prior to the suit 
reaching federal court. 
The PLRA does not enumerate a claim of excessive force as an exclusion 
to the exhaustion requirement.  Congress realized that any prisoner complaint 
might be frivolous so the PLRA was drafted without exclusions.  Congress also 
reasoned that by utilizing the administrative grievance process, prison officials 
could take immediate action should a problem actually exist within the prison 
system.  Processing a claim of excessive force through the administrative 
grievance process will allow prison officials to resolve the matter in a more 
effective manner by either immediately removing the offending guards, adding 
more supervisors or by changing an internal process or procedure. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. Nussle has effectively slammed 
the door shut on inmates trying to shortcut the exhaustion requirement of the 
PLRA.  The Porter holding will have broad implications on prisoner litigation.  
The Court not only held that a claim of excessive force is a prison condition for 
purposes of the PLRA, but the holding also made it perfectly clear that any suit 
brought by a prisoner relating to prison life, whether an isolated incident or 
systemic, must be carried through the administrative grievance process before 
moving to federal court.  As a result of Porter, the PLRA goal to reduce inmate 
litigation in federal courts can finally be realized.  Ultimately, the inmate, 
America’s judicial and prison systems, and taxpayers will benefit as a result of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Porter. 
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